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The Nile Basin can only facilitate the much needed African regional 
integration if all parties know how to share both the costs and benefits 
from this rich resource.
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AFRICA
On March 23, 2015, Egypt, Ethiopia and the Sudan signed a declaration of principles 
on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance 
Dam1 (GERD). Since then, there has 
been intense debate regarding the 
modalities and core principles which 
were spelled out in the Declaration. 
Unfortunately, the principles 
contained in the Declaration have 
invited unhealthy rhetoric, particularly 
within Egypt, Ethiopia and among the 
Ethiopian diaspora. 
There are two fundamental reasons 
for the negative discourses. The first 
one involves the non-cooperative, 
zero-sum game strategic behaviour 
that is inherent within the actions of 
the parties. Game theorists, political 
scientists and economists very well 
know that shared watercourses invite 
unilateral and self-interest maximising 
actions – the well-known zero-sum 
positions being the dominant solution. 
Added to this is the emotive nature of 
the Nile River usage that was instigated 
and imposed upon the peoples of the 
region by colonialism. Secondly, Egypt 
has long-held historical ambitions to 
control the sources of the Nile and 
maintain the colonial era position that 
is still reflected in the Declaration. 
On closer examination, we find that 
several of the current stipulations of 
the Declaration include many of the 
key elements of the 1929 and 1959 
“Nile Water Agreements” that Ethiopia 
was not a party to. Consequently, 
the Declaration is not framed in 
a positive-sum game (“win-win”) 
manner. 
Cognisant of the fact that the 
construction of the Grand Renaissance 
Dam has become a game changer, 
with its strong potential to lead for 
cooperation, we attempted to show 
that Egypt’s policy towards Ethiopia 
has been unsustainable. We did so 
in our April 30, 2014 commentary. 
Even though we did not have the full 
and official Declaration in hand at the 
time of writing, we also attempted 
to raise awareness as well as our 
concerns using a short commentary 
that we disseminated on March 23, 
2015. In particular, we called for (i) 
the translation of the actual Agreement 
into various Ethiopian languages; (ii) 
the revision of certain clauses; and 
(iii) as Egypt’s President was heading 
to address the Ethiopian Parliament 
and request for ratification, we called 
upon the Government of Ethiopia to 
defer this process to allow time and 
space for reflection. After the release of 
that commentary, Aigaforum.com2, a 
website that is close to the Government 
of Ethiopia, posted a document which 
purports to be the final and authentic 
version of the Agreement. Except for 
the location of the signing, and singular-
plural uses of certain terms, see for 
example “resources” versus “resource” 
in the preamble and the sequence of 
the numbering of Principles III and IV 
of the Agreement, when compared to 
other versions available in the internet, 
the document appears to be authentic.3 
Though speculations are rife that the 
final agreement is still a secret, because 
of the importance of the matter, for this 
commentary we have used the version 
that was made available by Aigaforum.
com.
Many have opined and welcomed 
the recent Egyptian diplomatic 
overture towards Africa, and its 
acceptance of the construction of the 
GERD, in particular. Even though the 
current tripartite Agreement seemed 
to have temporarily eased the recent 
tension among the parties, and despite 
some of the positive aspects of the 
Egyptian diplomatic overtures and 
its intent to cooperate as spelled out 
in the Declaration, we observe that 
the Agreement is unsustainable in its 
current form. In fact, our examination 
of the Declaration of principles leads 
to the conclusion that the clauses are 
designed to re-assert the 1929 and 
1959 water sharing agreements and 
the much criticised Framework for 
General Co-operation Between the 
Arab Republic of Egypt and Ethiopia, 
July 1993, Cairo, Egypt4 that was 
signed by the Presidents of Egypt and 
Ethiopia. 
In this follow up commentary on 
GERD, we independently examine, in 
a non-technical manner, the elements 
of the tripartite Agreement which 
was signed in Khartoum on March 
23, 2015. We do so by identifying 
omissions, sticky points and mistakes 
that need attention. Consistent with 
our April 30, 2014 commentary on 
this topic, we attempt to decouple 
political posturing within Ethiopia from 
the trans-boundary water issues that 
are facing the country. In doing so, we 
focus on the substantive issues so that 
the country avoids the repeat of the 
mistakes in  the Algiers Agreement of 
2000 between Eritrea and Ethiopia and 
the series of diplomatic manoeuvrings 
that created a landlocked country in 
1993.5 We decided to incorporate 
the clauses that are contained in 
the Declaration for the reader’s 
convenience. 
Analysis of the Agreement
There are ten principles stated in the 
current Agreement. Below we provide 
comments for each of these elements. 
For convenience, we juxtapose the 
principles in italics and our comments, 
which follow each of these principles 
in plain text.
I. Principle of cooperation 
• To cooperate based on common 
understanding, mutual benefit, good 
faith, win-win, and principles of 
international law;
• To cooperate in understanding 
upstream and downstream water 
needs in its various aspects.
Our Brief Assessments 
1. This article is not very different 
in spirit from the framework 
for cooperation that was signed 
between Egypt and Ethiopia in 1993. 
The intent of this principle appears 
to invoke clauses in the UN’s 
Convention on the Law of the Non-
Navigational Uses of International 
Watercourses that was adopted on 
21, May, 19976 and the Declaration 
on Principles of International Law 
Concerning Friendly Relations 
and Co-operation among States in 
accordance with UN Resolution 
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the sources of the 
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2625, (1970).7 It is however 
important to note that 17 years after 
its adoption, other than the United 
Kingdom no major power had 
signed the non-navigational use of 
international waters Convention. By 
the end of 2014, only 38 countries 
(out of about 194 Member States) 
have signed/accepted and ratified 
it.8 It is also interesting to note that 
11 of the 38 countries are located 
in the African continent, but these 
do not include Egypt, Ethiopia and 
Sudan, none of whom have signed, 
accepted or ratified this Convention. 
2. The most controversial element of 
the 1997 UN Convention is Article 
7 which deals with “not to cause 
significant harm” by upstream 
countries on downstream countries. 
Concerned by the ramifications 
of this clause, many upstream 
countries that have important trans-
boundary rivers are either shying 
away from ratifying the Convention 
or are openly objecting to it, as the 
Convention: (a) does not provide 
for compensation to upstream 
countries for lost opportunities, and 
(b) exposes them to indeterminate 
and an uninsurable risk. As we shall 
see below, Article 7 features in 
both the recently signed tripartite 
Agreement (without recognition of 
opportunity costs and a damage 
limitation clause) and in Article 5 of 
the 1993 agreement between Egypt 
and Ethiopia. 
3. The Phrase “principles of 
international law” neither 
implicitly nor explicitly recognises 
the existence of the Nile 
Basin Cooperative Framework 
Agreement. Hence it fails to guide 
a comprehensive agreement 
pertinent to the region.9
4. The phrase “in its various aspects” 
suggests that downstream countries 
need additional waters or if they 
decide to develop new habitations, 
the upstream countries may have 
to give up their development 
opportunities. Research shows 
that downstream countries 
are usually densely populated 
and industrialised, have flatter 
topographies and hence their water 
needs are higher than upstream 
countries. Furthermore, even 
though the Agreement is about the 
GERD (see the heading and the 
preamble of the Agreement), the 
Article is sweeping and covers the 
entire river system as we shall see 
below.  
II. Principle of Development, Regional 
Integration and Sustainability;
• The purpose of GERD is for power 
generation, to contribute to 
economic development, promotion 
of trans-boundary cooperation 
and regional integration through 
the generation of sustainable and 
reliable clean energy supply.
Our Brief Assessments
The text states that the purpose of 
the project is to generate “sustainable 
and reliable clean energy supply”. 
There are no auxiliary purposes, so this 
clause could be interpreted to exclude, 
for example, the use of the waters for 
fishing, recreation, education and small 
scale industrial and irrigation projects 
around the dam. We do think that 
there are costs (risks) in agreeing to this 
clause for the upstream country. There 
are no provisions for planting trees 
(timber, coffee, etc.), for example, to 
mitigate the erosion and evaporation, 
capture the carbon and/or put the 
soil into better use. This clause is, 
therefore, devoid of shared benefits 
and responsibilities. 
III. Principle Equitable and Reasonable 
Utilisation
• The three countries shall utilise 
their shared water resources in their 
respective territories in an equitable 
and reasonable manner
• In ensuring their equitable and 
reasonable utilisation, the three 
countries will take into account 
all the relevant guiding factors 
listed below, but not limited to the 
following outlined:
o Geographic, hydrographic, 
hydrological, climatic, ecological 
and other factors of a natural 
character;
o The social and economic needs of 
the Basin States concerned;
o The population dependent on 
the water resources in each Basin 
State;
o The effects of the use or uses of 
the water resources in one Basin 
State on other Basin States;
o Existing and potential uses of the 
water resources;
o Conservation, protection, 
development and economy of 
use of the water resources and 
the costs of measures taken to 
that effect;
o The availability of alternatives, of 
comparable value, to a particular 
planned or existing use.
Our Brief Assessments
1. Even though this principle appears 
to be normal, it obligates Ethiopia 
to continue honouring Article 5 of 
the 1993 cooperation framework 
between Egypt and Ethiopia.  
2. Sub article III (e), which deals with 
the existing and potential uses of 
the water resources is a sticky point. 
It will continue to be a source of 
tension as it is the focal point of 
the relationship between upstream 
and downstream countries. It needs 
to be examined in the light of the 
principles that are enshrined in the 
Nile basin framework.  
3. Sub article III(f) does not sufficiently 
obligate downstream countries to 
invest in water conservation and 
rationalisation. The laxity of this 
sub article legitimises the increased 
demand for water by downstream 
countries.
4. The scope of the Agreement does 
not include ground water resources 
available in downstream countries.  
IV. Principle of Not to Cause Significant 
Harm
• The Three Countries shall take all 
appropriate measures to prevent 
AFRICA
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the causing of significant harm in 
utilising the Blue/Main Nile.
• Where significant harm nevertheless 
is caused to one of the countries, the 
state whose use causes such harm 
shall, in the absence of agreement 
to such use, take all appropriate 
measures in consultations with 
the affected state to eliminate or 
mitigate such harm and, where 
appropriate, to discuss the question 
of compensation.
Our Brief Assessments 
As indicated above, this clause is 
taken from Article 7 of the 1997 UN 
Convention on the Law of the Non-
navigational Uses of International 
Watercourses 1997 (effective as of 
April, 2014). The “obligation not to 
cause significant harm” is related to the 
age-old economic theory of externality 
which features in European trans-
boundary waters and environmental 
agreements, in the form of the “polluter 
pays” principle. The UN Convention 
states that:
“(a) Watercourse States shall, in 
utilizing an international watercourse 
in their territories, take all appropriate 
measures to prevent the causing of 
significant harm to other watercourse 
States.
(b) Where significant harm 
nevertheless is caused to another 
watercourse State, the States whose 
use causes such harm shall, in the 
absence of agreement to such use, 
take all appropriate measures, having 
due regard for the provisions of articles 
5 and 6, in consultation with the 
affected State, to eliminate or mitigate 
such harm and, where appropriate, to 
discuss the question of compensation.”
Article #2 of the 1997 Convention 
defines the term “watercourse” as 
follows:-
“‘Watercourse’ means a system 
of surface waters and ground waters 
constituting by virtue of their physical 
relationship a unitary whole and 
normally flowing into a common 
terminus.”
It is interesting to note that the 
tripartite Agreement avoids the use 
of the term “watercourse” and hence 
excludes the ground water resources in 
Egypt and Sudan that recent geoscience 
studies are indicating.10 Furthermore, it 
is important to note that “international 
law” is selectively used here to 
strengthen the position of the initiator-
originator of the current text.  
1. The opening paragraph of the 
tripartite Agreement starts with 
a rather misleading sentence. It 
states that “the three countries shall 
take all appropriate measures….” 
The article specifically deals 
with damages and not “causing 
significant harm in utilising the 
Blue/Main Nile”. The Blue/Main 
Nile originates from the highlands 
of Ethiopia and contributes 
approximately about 85% of the 
water to the Nile River system, and 
hence this clause is about Ethiopia. 
Downstream countries are not 
affected by this clause as Ethiopia 
is.  The clause is unambiguous in 
giving downstream countries the 
right to “take appropriate measures 
to prevent significant damage” 
by the upstream country.  The 
obvious issue that emerges here is 
sovereignty over the waters of the 
Blue/Main Nile, and the issue is 
more than likely to be a sticky point 
in that neither sovereign equality 
nor territorial integrity clauses (see 
Principle # IX below) are sufficient 
to protect Ethiopia. In fact there is 
concern that it can be construed as 
a voluntary ceding of sovereignty by 
Ethiopia.  
2. The phrase “significant harm” 
is not defined and there are no 
thresholds about water sharing, 
physical damages arising from faulty 
construction/management of the 
dam and Act of God. Hence it is 
subject to various interpretations. 
3. The clause refers to the Blue Nile/
Main River. The Blue Nile/Main 
River has tributaries. In the absence 
of an exclusion clause for the 
tributaries, this clause may be used 
to restrict Ethiopia from developing 
irrigation projects on any of the 
tributaries of Blue Nile.  
V.  Principle to Cooperate on the First 
Filling and Operation of the Dam
• To implement the recommendations 
of the International Panel of Experts 
(IPOE), respect the final outcomes of 
the Technical National Committee 
(TNC) Final Report on the joint 
studies recommended in the IPOE 
Final Report throughout the different 
phases of the project.
• The three countries, in the spirit 
of cooperation, will utilise the 
final outcomes of the joint studies, 
to be conducted as per the 
recommendations of the IPoE Report 
and agreed upon by the TNC, to:-
o Agree on guidelines and rules 
on the first filling of GERD which 
shall cover all different scenarios, 
in parallel with the construction 
of GERD.
o Agree on guidelines and rules for 
the annual operation of GERD, 
which the owner of the dam may 
adjust from time to time.
o  Inform the downstream 
countries of any unforeseen or 
urgent circumstances requiring 
adjustments in the operation of 
GERD.
o To sustain cooperation and 
coordination on the annual 
operation of GERD with 
downstream reservoirs, the 
three countries, through the line 
ministries responsible for water, 
shall set up an appropriate 
coordination mechanism among 
them.
o The time line for conducting the 
above mentioned process shall 
be 15 months from the inception 
of the two studies recommended 
by the IPoE.
Our Brief Assessments 
1. Implicit in Article V is that the project 
is going ahead. Only the filling 
of the reservoir and operational/
functional matters of the dam are 
to be negotiated. The presumption 
AFRICA
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is that the pace of the filling should 
be slow enough to supply water 
to downstream countries but fast 
enough to satisfy Ethiopia’s needs as 
the NPR’s reporter has put it.
2. This article however crucially 
depends on a report that is yet to be 
produced. The leaked IPoE report 
vindicates Ethiopia on many fronts 
and as we indicated in our April 30 
2014 commentary the deficiencies 
are not insurmountable. It remains 
to be seen whether the TNC report 
will be different from the one 
produced by IPoE. Notwithstanding 
this, the environmental aspect 
of the TNC report is expected 
to echo Egyptian concerns. It is 
important that the environmental 
impact assessment of the project 
be comprehensive and linked to (i) 
current and potential ground water 
resources in downstream countries 
and (ii) the rather wasteful use of the 
resource in downstream countries 
and pollution around the delta.  
3. Sub article V(b) refers to the 
“owner” of the dam, in the singular, 
and resolves the speculation about 
joint ownership, at least for the 
moment. As a result of the sensitivity 
of the project, we encourage the 
Government of Ethiopia not to allow 
either equity or linked participation 
at this time.11   
VI.  Principle of Confidence 
Building
• Priority will be given to downstream 
countries to purchase power 
generated from GERD.
Our Brief Assessments 
1. Clean energy production and sale 
reduces the downstream countries’ 
dependency on fossil fuel generated 
energy. Hence, this is not just a 
“confidence building” issue. It has 
direct and measurable economic 
consequences, and hence needs 
to be imputed in the pricing of 
electricity for the proposed sale.  
2. In many economies electricity falls 
within rate regulated industries. 
Hence, pricing for domestic use will 
be different from pricing for export. 
International pricing will be a more 
complicated issue and may not be 
easily decoupled from the type of 
intergovernmental relationships that 
emerge in the region.  
3. The word “will” is equivocal since 
it has several meanings in the legal 
lexicon as in thesaurus, and hence 
may serve as a point of future 
contention. 
VII.  Principle of Exchange of 
Information and Data; Egypt, 
Ethiopia, and Sudan shall provide 
data and information needed for the 
conduct of the TNC joint studies in 
good faith and in a timely manner.
Our Brief Assessments 
1. As indicated earlier, the IPoE had 
already stated that the social and 
environmental aspects of the project 
in downstream countries need an 
additional study. The availability 
of such information should enable 
Ethiopia to complete the study. As 
indicated above, the study however 
needs to be comprehensive, and 
does not have to be confined to the 
project.
2. Data accuracy, completeness and 
integrity can be sticky problems.
3. Certain technical (engineering 
design, formulae, etc.) information 
might be proprietary and therefore 
confidential. The parties need to 
determine the minimum level of 
disclosure. 
VIII. Principle of Dam Safety
• The three countries appreciate 
the efforts undertaken thus far by 
Ethiopia in implementing the IPoE 
recommendations pertinent to the 
GERD safety.
• Ethiopia shall in good faith continue 
the full implementation of the Dam 
safety recommendations as per the 
IPoE report.
Our Brief Assessments
1. Dam safety is as important for 
Ethiopia as it is for downstream 
countries. Notwithstanding this 
it is important to ensure that 
“best practice” is followed so 
that habitations and civilisations 
in downstream countries are not 
threatened by faulty construction 
and substandard operations.
2. Downstream countries are 
formally acknowledging Ethiopia’s 
compliance effort, and it is good.
IX.  Principle of Sovereignty and 
Territorial Integrity
• The three countries shall cooperate 
on the basis of sovereign equality, 
territorial integrity, mutual benefit 
and good faith in order to attain 
optimal utilisation and adequate 
protection of the River.
Our Brief Assessments
1. The concept of “sovereign equality” 
features in many international 
agreements, conventions and 
constitutive acts (example the African 
Union), and is defined in the UN’s 
1990 Declaration on Principles.12 
It states that “sovereign equality” 
includes the following elements: (a) 
States are judicially equal; (b) Each 
State enjoys the rights inherent in 
full sovereignty; (c) Each State has 
the duty to respect the personality 
of other States; (d) The territorial 
integrity and political independence 
of the State are inviolable; (e) Each 
State has the right freely to choose 
and develop its political, social, 
economic and cultural systems; (f) 
Each State has the duty to comply 
fully and in good faith with its 
international obligations and to live 
in peace with other States.13
2. This article is fairly standard and also 
features in the 1993 framework. 
However, it is unlikely to override 
the articles that dealt with damages 
and rights that appear to have been 
voluntarily ceded to downstream 
countries in connection with the 
Blue/Main Nile and its tributaries. 
X.  Principle of Peaceful Settlement of 
Disputes
AFRICA
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• The Three countries will settle 
disputes, arising out of the 
interpretation or implementation of 
this agreement, amicably through 
consultation or negotiation in 
accordance with the principle of 
good faith. If the Parties are unable 
to resolve the dispute through 
consultation or negotiation, they 
may jointly request for conciliation, 
mediation or refer the matter for the 
consideration of the Heads of State.
Our Brief Assessments
This article is also fairly standard. It 
evolves from the UN 1990 Convention 
and that of the UN Charter. When 
this article is read together with 
Principle 1 of this tripartite Agreement, 
it brings back the 1997 Convention 
and the mediation, arbitration and 
determination role of the International 
Court of Justice. Ethiopia’s experience 
with arbitration has not been good 
and the Algiers Agreement and the 
ruling made by the Eritrea-Ethiopia 
Boundary Commission14 are too fresh 
to be forgotten. Despite this fact, 
with lopsided clauses stacked against 
Ethiopia and in the absence of sound 
rules and principles governing the Nile 
water allocation and management, 
a “third party”, particularly in the 
context of the Nile Basin Cooperation 
Framework Agreement may lead to a 
better outcome. 
Concluding Remarks
In summary, when the recent 
tripartite Agreement on the GERD 
is compared with the 1993 bilateral 
agreement, though in many respects 
the spirits of the two agreements appear 
similar, there are important differences. 
The current Agreement reaffirms 
Article 5 of the 1993 agreement 
which favoured Egypt, includes terms 
about compensation for damages, 
restricts the scope of the dam project, 
recognises “rights” to take action on 
the Blue/Main Nile, is sloppy on water 
utilisation in downstream countries, 
and the non-exclusion of the tributaries 
from the Agreement cumulatively puts 
Ethiopia at a disadvantage. 
The obvious and fundamental 
question that arises in the minds 
of many observers is whether a 
reasonable government representative 
of an independent upstream country, 
irrespective of his/her political credo, 
would sign without duress, the tripartite 
Agreement in its present form. In light of 
the above analysis and consistent with 
our initial reaction of March 24, 2015, 
we reiterate our statement that no free 
nation should be subjected to be a party 
to such a lopsided and risky Agreement. 
We also think the shared Nile waters 
represent opportunities for all riparian 
counties. However, the good fortunes 
emanating from the Nile can only 
be leveraged if all riparian countries 
are able to overcome the seemingly 
self-interest maximising but counter-
productive zero-sum game actions. 
The Nile Basin can only facilitate 
the much needed African regional 
integration if all parties know how to 
share both the costs and benefits from 
this rich resource. Hence, the central 
point of departure for making bilateral, 
tripartite, quadripartite (as the case 
may be) agreements should be the 
Nile Basin Cooperative Framework 
Agreement, which includes all the 
riparian states, and centres around the 
equitable sharing of the trans-boundary 
watercourses. Egypt must not be 
allowed to maintain its supremacy by 
undermining the regional cooperation 
framework that is already in motion.   
Hence, in the interest of an equitable, 
fair, sustainable, comprehensive solution 
that guarantees shared benefits and 
responsibilities, we, therefore, call upon:
• Policymakers and stakeholders of 
all riparian counties to understand 
that trans-boundary water flows, 
by their nature, are susceptible to 
the tragedy of the commons – that 
attempts by individual nations acting 
independently or in a dominant 
manner could only damage the 
common resource, and recognise 
that only shared responsibilities can 
guarantee shared benefits;
• The parties to the current 
Declaration to rectify the unfair, 
unequitable and unsustainable 
clauses that are damaging any party, 
Ethiopia in particular; 
• All political parties in the riparian 
states refrain from using the shared 
waters of the Nile for their self-
preserving interests;  
• The Declaration and future 
negotiations should evolve from the 
laudable Nile Basin Cooperative 
Agreement;15 
• Any signed treaties and declaration 
of principles be immediately 
translated into major Ethiopian and 
other riparian states languages so 
that the general public is aware of 
what is going on;
• Hydrologists, economists, lawyers, 
ecologists, geoscientists, sociologists, 
water engineers and diplomats etc., 
in the region to make professional 
contributions so that the water 
sharing problem is resolved for the 
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water flows, by their 
nature, are susceptible 
to the tragedy of 
the commons – that 
attempts by individual 
nations acting 
independently or in 
a dominant manner 
could only damage the 
common resource, and 
recognise that only 
shared responsibilities 
can guarantee shared 
benefits.
